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Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 A disability policy and a business overhead expense 
policy issued by Appellee Minnesota Life Insurance 
Company covered Appellant Kevin Witasick.1  Those policies 
were later acquired and administered by Appellee Standard 
Insurance Company.  Witasick made claims against both 
policies, which were honored by the Appellees.  A dispute 
arose, however, concerning the coverage of some of 
Witasick’s claimed business expenses.  After years of 
discussion and negotiation, the parties ultimately settled their 
dispute.  Standard agreed to pay more than $4 million in 
consideration to Witasick and Witasick agreed to release all 
claims—known, unknown, and any future claims— against 
the Appellee insurance companies.  The settlement also 
contained a covenant not to sue, whereby Witasick agreed not 
to pursue any cause of action against Standard and Minnesota 
Life stemming from “any conduct prior to the date the Parties 
sign this document, or which is related to, or arises out of” the 
insurance policies.  Supp. App. at 29.   
 While these settlement negotiations were taking place, 
the United States Government notified Witasick that he was 
the target of a federal grand jury investigation related to 
certain fraud charges and business expense claims on his 
federal income tax returns.  Witasick was indicted in October 
of 2007.  To support its charge of mail fraud, the Government 
relied on information and documents Witasick had submitted 
                                              
1 While his wife is a named party to this appeal, we will refer 
only to Mr. Witasick throughout this opinion. 
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to Appellee Standard.  An employee of Standard testified 
before the Grand Jury and then again at Witasick’s trial.  
Witasick was found guilty of most of the charges, the 
exception being his acquittal on the mail fraud charge.2  He 
was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment. 
 
 In November of 2011, Witasick filed a complaint 
against the Appellee insurance companies.  The complaint 
contained more than twenty claims based on the former 
policies or on Standard’s cooperation with the Government 
prosecution.  The Appellees asked the District Court to 
dismiss the complaint, arguing that Witasick’s claims were 
prohibited by the settlement agreement.  The District Court 
agreed and dismissed the complaint.  Witasick filed a motion 
for reconsideration which was likewise denied.  Witasick 
appeals.  We will affirm. 
 
Appellate Jurisdiction 
 Whether we have appellate jurisdiction is the threshold 
issue in this case.  A notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  This time limit is “mandatory and 
jurisdictional.”   Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10 
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If an order 
granting a motion to dismiss is not set out in a separate 
document, then judgment is not deemed entered until “150 
days have run from the entry in the civil docket.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P.  58(a), (c)(2)(B).  “[A]n order is treated as a separate 
document if it satisfies three criteria: (1) it must be self-
contained and separate from the opinion, (2) it must note the 
                                              
2 Witasick’s wife was acquitted on all charges. 
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relief granted, and (3) it must omit (or at least substantially 
omit) the trial court’s reasons for disposing of the claims.”  
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Cntr. Ass’n., 503 F.3d 
217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Local Union No. 1992, IBEW 
v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2004); In re 
Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation, 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2006)).   
 
 Here, the District Court’s memorandum opinion 
granting the motion to dismiss was entered on March 25, 
2013.  Because Witasick did not file his notice of appeal until 
September 23, 2013—considerably more than 30 days after 
the entry of the memorandum opinion—Appellees contend 
that the notice was filed too late and that we should dismiss 
the appeal.  See, e.g., Bowles, supra.  (timely filing of a notice 
of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement).  We 
disagree. 
 
 The March 25, 2013, ten-page memorandum opinion 
resolved all claims and detailed the District Court’s reasons 
for granting the motion to dismiss.  However, it did not set 
out the judgment of dismissal in a separate document.  
Instead, page 10 of the memorandum (under a heading of 
“Conclusion”) states that “[a]ccordingly and incorporating the 
discussion held during oral argument on the motion, IT IS 
ORDERED this 25th day of March, 2013, that Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the Complaint [16] is hereby GRANTED.”  
Supp. App. at 20.  An electronic signature (/s/) for Judge 
Joseph Rodriguez was appended to the memorandum.  Supp. 
App. at 20.  The problem, however, is that this order is not 
self-contained and it includes the District Court’s reasoning.  
Therefore, it cannot be considered a separate document.  See 
In re Cendant, 454 F.3d at 243.  The District Court itself 
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seemed to realize that it never entered a separate document 
when it dismissed the Appellant’s complaint.  In July of 2013, 
Witasick filed a motion asking the District Court to enter a 
judgment pursuant to Rule 58(a), presumably so he could 
appeal.  Appellees filed a memorandum in opposition and the 
District Court denied the motion as moot in January of 2014.3  
In its order denying the motion, the District Court specifically 
noted that “[b]ecause no separate document was entered to 
reflect the March 25, 2013 decision, judgment was deemed 
entered after 150 days pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.  58(c)(2).”  
Supp. App. at 28.  Accordingly, judgment was not entered 
until August 22, 2013—150 days after March 25, 2013. 
 
 There is a second questionably relevant document to 
the issue of appellate jurisdiction:  a docket entry also dated 
March 25, 2013 stating “Civil Case Terminated.”  Supp. App. 
at 21.  Appellees point to this entry as a “separate document,” 
arguing that it notes the relief granted, and that such 
electronic entries can satisfy the separate judgment 
requirement of Rule 58.  This entry, without a doubt, relates 
nothing of the District Court’s reasoning.  See In re Cendant, 
454 F.3d at 242.  However, it cannot be considered a separate 
document because the phrase “Civil Case Terminated” tells 
us nothing of the relief granted.  It is a mere clerical notation 
by court personnel that the case is over, without saying why.  
Of course, a case can be terminated for any number of 
reasons, such as a failure to prosecute, a failure to pay certain 
fees, a grant of summary judgment, a jury verdict, and so on.  
This entry is also used to administratively close a case during 
                                              
3 The District Court found the motion mooted by the filing of 
Appellant’s notice of appeal in September of 2013.  We 
discuss this problematic document later in this opinion. 
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an interlocutory appeal or during a stay to allow a party to 
exhaust remedies, for example.  A case can also be 
“terminated” while a district court seeks counsel for a pro se 
litigant.  Here, the notation “Civil Case Terminated” is simply 
too vague to satisfy the second criteria of In re Cendant and a 
docket entry containing such a notation cannot be considered 
a separate document of judgment. 
 
 We agree, however, with the Appellees’ larger point: 
electronic entries made by a district court via the federal 
CM/ECF System4 can, in certain circumstances, satisfy Rule 
58’s requirement.  This is hardly controversial.  The District 
of New Jersey, as well as every other federal court, provides 
for electronic entries and gives them the force and effect of a 
                                              
4 As the PACER website explains, “The Case 
Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system is the 
Federal Judiciary’s comprehensive case management system 
for all bankruptcy, district, and appellate courts.  CM/ECF 
allows courts to accept filings and provides access to filed 
documents online.  CM/ECF gives access to case files by 
multiple parties, and offers expanded search and reporting 
capabilities. The system also offers the ability to immediately 
update dockets and download documents and print them 
directly from the court system.”  Case 
Management/Electronic Case Files, 
https://www.pacer.gov/cmecf/; see also Ragguette v. Premier 
Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 321 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The 
Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system 
is a computer case management system that allows courts to 
maintain electronic case files and attorneys to file (and serve) 
documents through the Internet”). 
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court order.  However, a holding that every electronic docket 
entry satisfies Rule 58’s requirements paints with too broad a 
brush.   
 
 The federal CM/ECF system allows for three distinct 
types of case-related entries: text orders, utility events, and 
minute entries.  A text order, as its name suggests, is an order 
of the court, with specific text granting, denying, or otherwise 
resolving a motion or, ultimately, a case.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 232 (3d Cir. 2007).  Text 
orders can also be used to set a hearing, order briefing, and 
direct service.  Such orders may be used to rule on 
substantive motions, like those seeking summary judgment, 
or those asking for a complaint to be dismissed under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure   12(b)(6).  See, e.g., Gannon Int’l, 
Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2012).  Text 
orders additionally may be used to resolve other issues that 
arise during litigation, like motions to suppress evidence, 
and/or relatively routine motions as determined by the 
District Judge or Clerk of Court.  Indeed, the CM/ECF User 
Manual for the District of New Jersey specifically 
acknowledges the use of such orders: “the assigned judge or 
the Clerk’s Office, if appropriate, may grant routine orders by 
text-only docket entry for which a Notice of Electronic Filing 
will be generated.  In such cases, no PDF document will be 
issued and the text order shall constitute the Court’s only 
order on the matter.”  ECF User Manual at page 8 (Rev. 5-1-
2013), 
www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/CMECFUserGuide.pdf.  
Text orders usually have no difficulty satisfying the separate 
document requirement of Rule 58(a) and In re Cendant, 
supra.  They are separate and self-contained from any actual 
opinion; they note the relief granted; and they omit (or 
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substantially omit) the District Court’s reasoning.  And, 
significantly, they contain an electronic signature of a judge. 
  
 The two other types of electronic docket entries are 
vastly different from text orders.  Indeed, they are not orders 
at all.  A “utility event” is an entry which records an event or 
action in the life of a case and often appears only on a court’s 
private docket. 5   Utility events memorialize on the docket 
mundane matters like the addition of an attorney to the 
docket, the re-assigning of a case to a different judge, the 
referral of a case to mediation or a special master, the sealing 
of a case, the appointment of an interpreter or, apropos to this 
appeal, the termination of a case.  These entries differ from 
“minute entries” in that minute entries reflect time spent in 
court.  Minute entries might memorialize the time spent in a 
case management conference, a contempt hearing, a motion 
hearing, or a pre-trial conference.  Like utility events, minute 
entries are not orders of the district court nor are they signed 
by a judge.  As such, they cannot serve as a foundation for an 
appeal.  See, e.g., Theriot v. ASW Well Serv. Inc., 951 F.2d 
84, 87 (5th Cir. 1992) (“A minute entry, although it is a record 
of the court’s final decision in a case or of an appellate 
interlocutory decision, cannot constitute a ‘separate 
document’ for the purposes of meeting the Rule 58 
requirement.”). 
 
                                              
5 The CM/ECF system includes both public and private 
docket entries.  Of course, public entries are available to the 
general public.  However, “[p]rivate docket entries are for use 
by chambers and COA staff only and are not available to the 
public.”  Third Circuit Court of Appeals Technology Guide, 
page 12, § 4.2 (August 4, 2014).   
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 Therefore, because no separate document of judgment 
was filed in this case, the District Court’s decision became 
final 150 days after it was entered—August 22, 2013.  
Witasick had 30 days from that date to file a Notice of 
Appeal.  On September 23, 2013, he filed a document with 
the District Court entitled a “Contingent Notice of Appeal.”  
Because September 22, 2013 was a Sunday, Witasick’s notice 
was timely filed on Monday, September 23, 2013.  We now 
turn our attention to that document. 
 
The Contingent Notice of Appeal 
 In July of 2013, Witasick filed a motion in the District 
Court asking it to enter a separate judgment.  On September 
23, 2013—the last day he could file a notice of appeal—
Witasick filed another motion asking the District Court to 
enter a separate document.  He styled this motion a 
“Contingent Notice of Appeal of the court’s March 25, 2013 
order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s complaint.”  Supp. App. at 22-25.  In the last 
paragraph of this motion, Witasick stated “[i]f, however, the 
Court denies the Plaintiffs’ Rule 58 request, this Contingent 
Notice of Appeal will then become the Plaintiffs’ formal 
Notice of Appeal of the Court’s March 25, 2013 Order 
dismissing the Plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety.”  Supp. 
App. at 25.  This type of document is unorthodox, but not 
unheard of.  See, e.g., CE Design, Ltd. v. Cy’s Crab House 
North, Inc., 731 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Truck 
Insurance could have filed a contingent notice of appeal . . . to 
protect its interests . . . .);  In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 
F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2001) (party filed a contingent notice 
of appeal upon advice of the Court).    
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 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 sets out the 
requirements for a valid notice of appeal.  The Rule requires 
that the notice specify three things: the party taking the 
appeal, the order being appealed from, and the name of the 
court to which the appeal is taken.  Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A-
C).  This rule is “jurisdictional in nature” and “[we] may not  
waive its jurisdictional requirements, even for good cause.”  
Massie v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 340, 
348 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that Rule 3’s requirements are to be construed liberally.6  
See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992).  Witasick is 
unambiguously the party taking the appeal here.  And, the 
contingent notice references the order being appealed.  Albeit 
unstated, we also think the destination of the appeal can be 
sufficiently gleaned from the entire document and this defect 
does not strip us of our appellate jurisdiction on its own.  Cf. 
Anderson v. District of Columbia, 72 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (exercising jurisdiction over appeal that mistakenly 
listed the Supreme Court of the United States, rather than the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit).  
Common sense dictates as much.  See Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 387 (1978); Matute v. Procoast 
Navigation Ltd., 928 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir. 1991), overruled 
on other grounds by Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 63 
F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
                                              
6 The Supreme Court’s admonition to apply these 
requirements liberally has special force where pro se litigants 
are concerned.  Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  We note that while Witasick represents himself 
on appeal, his contingent notice of appeal was signed and 
filed by counsel on Witasick’s behalf. 
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 The nature of Witasick’s contingent notice leaves 
some question as to whether he conclusively established his 
intention to appeal.  See Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 156 
(3d Cir. 1998) (document filed by litigant, regardless of its 
title, within the time for appeal under Fed.R.App.P. 4, is 
effective as notice of appeal provided that it gives sufficient 
notice of party’s intent to appeal);  Dura Sys., Inc. v. 
Rothbury Invs., Ltd., 886 F.2d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1989).  At 
one point, Witasick’s contingent notice flatly states that “it is 
not the Plaintiff’s intention to divest this Court (the District 
Court) of jurisdiction by filing this document, particularly 
given the various outstanding motions which have not yet 
been ruled upon, and that is why the Plaintiffs’ have called it 
a ‘contingent’ notice of appeal.”  Supp. App. at 25.  Since a 
notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction, this 
statement injects a degree of ambiguity into Witasick’s 
intention to appeal. 
 
 However, construing the contents of the entire 
document liberally, we are satisfied that Witasick, albeit 
awkwardly, has indicated an intention to appeal.  First, 
Witasick’s contingent notice asks the District Court to enter a 
separate judgment so that he can appeal.  Second, he states 
that since the District Court failed to enter a separate 
document of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, he finds 
it necessary to file a contingent notice to protect his right to 
appeal.  Third, Witasick filed his contingent notice on the day 
it was due—30 days after the entry of the judgment appealed 
from.  This shows us that Witasick intended to appeal and 
was well aware of the date by which he had to file his notice.  
Taken together, these evidence an intention to appeal, 
regardless of Witasick’s outlying comment to the contrary. 
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 Therefore, even though Witasick’s contingent notice 
falls somewhat short of the requirements of Rule 3, we will 
nevertheless find it to be the “functional equivalent” of a 
notice of appeal.  Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (quoting Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988)).  We 
strongly emphasize, however, that the use of a contingent 
notice of appeal is not recommended when attempting to 
concretely establish appellate jurisdiction.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480, 1486 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“The method utilized here is not recommended, but we think 
the letter is sufficient to give us appellate jurisdiction over 
Carson’s appeal.”). 
 
The Scope of the Notice of Appeal 
 Next, the parties dispute the scope of our appellate 
jurisdiction.  If an appeal is taken only from a specified 
judgment, we do not acquire jurisdiction to review other 
judgments not specified or “fairly . . . inferred” by the notice.  
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset 
Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 
F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)).  The Appellees argue that 
we have jurisdiction solely to review the March 25, 2013 
order because that was the order specifically designated in the 
Contingent Notice of Appeal. 7  That is accurate: Witasick’s 
                                              
7 Witasick also filed a Rule 59(e) motion challenging the 
District Court’s dismissal, which he failed to challenge in 
their notice of appeal.  Because Witasick did not file a new or 
amended notice of appeal encompassing the order denying 
the Rule 59(e) motion, we lack jurisdiction to consider that 
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notice clearly states that he appeals the District Court’s 
“March 25, 2013 Order dismissing the Plaintiffs’ complaint in 
its entirety.”  Supp. App. at 22-25.  Further, the notice itself 
repeatedly references his desire to preserve his appellate 
rights as they relate only to the March 25, 2013 order.  And, 
Witasick made no attempt to amend his contingent notice or 
file a new notice of appeal from any other order of the 
District Court.  Therefore, we conclude that this appeal is 
limited to the March 25, 2013 order. 
 
The Merits of Witasick’s Appeal 
 We use a de novo standard of review when reviewing a 
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.  See In re 
Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class 
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).  We thus apply the 
same standard as the District Court.  See Santomenno v. John 
Hancock Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2012).  In 
reviewing the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), like the District Court, we accept 
as true all factual allegations in the complaint and we 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage 
Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998).  We consider 
only facts alleged in the complaint, attached exhibits, and 
matters of public record.  See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 
263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).  We affirm a dismissal only if the 
plaintiff has failed to plead “‘enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Malleus v. George, 641 
                                                                                                     
order.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. 
McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).   
 
 Witasick’s argument is wholly without merit.  As part 
of the settlement—and for millions of dollars in 
consideration—Witasick agreed to abandon and relinquish all 
claims against the Appellees.  The settlement could not be 
clearer: 
 
[t]his document is intended to be a 
mutual release by the Witasicks 
and Standard.  These Releases 
include, but are not limited to any 
presently existing claims based 
upon the IDI Policy and the BOE 
Policy, breach of contract, 
negligent tort, intentional tort, bad 
faith, fraud, breach of a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, 
unfair insurance practices, or 
violation of any statute or 
regulation, as well as claims for 
attorney fees and costs. 
 
Supp. App. at 27.  Witasick also agreed to release the 
Appellees from any and all claims related to his alleged 
entitlement to benefits, and from any future claims, either 
known or unknown.  Supp. App. at 27-28, 29.  As the District 
Court noted, and our own review of the record confirms, the 
parties wanted to settle all claims, including those known and 
unknown, past, present and future, regarding the insurance 
policies at issue here.  Notably with the help and advice of 
counsel, Witasick agreed to the settlement and thereby 
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abandoned the claims set out in the complaint.  He also 
agreed not to sue the Appellee insurance companies, yet went 
ahead with a lawsuit.  Witasick is stuck with the terms of his 
bargain.   
 
 Witasick argues that reliance on a settlement 
agreement to bar litigation must be specifically pleaded as a 
defense.  We are unpersuaded.  Courts regularly take 
settlement agreements into consideration when dismissing 
complaints.  See, e.g., Blunt v. Lower Merion  Sch. Dist., 767 
F.3d 247, 281 (3d Cir. 2014); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1988).  Also, a Covenant Not to 
Sue is part of the settlement agreement.  This Covenant 
specifically prohibits Witasick from suing the Appellees “for 
any conduct prior to the date the Parties sign this document, 
or which is related to, or arises out of, the IDI Policy, the IDI 
Claim, the BOE Policy, or the BOE Claim, or which has been 
released or waived by this Release.”  Supp. App. at 29.  This 
is yet another bar to Witasick’s litigation.8   
                                              
8 Witasick also argues that a malicious prosecution claim 
survives outside of the settlement agreement/release.  Based 
on Standard’s cooperation with the federal government’s 
criminal prosecution, Witasick maintains that this claim was 
born after he executed the settlement.  But he contradicts 
himself by specifically stating that the alleged malicious 
prosecution began in 2002, five years before the settlement.  
Appellant’s Brief at 44.  This claim, however, is barred by the 
settlement agreement, no matter when it accrued and is 
wholly without merit.  Witasick agreed to release all claims 
that accrued prior to the execution of the settlement 
agreement.  Because Witasick explicitly released all claims 
against the Appellees that are predicated on conduct that 
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Conclusion 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing Witasick’s claims because they are barred by the 
Parties’ settlement agreement.9 
  
                                                                                                     
occurred before the settlement, the malicious prosecution 
claim is barred. 
 
9 The Appellees, pursuant to the provisions of the settlement 
agreement, are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.  As is 
our practice, we will award costs to the Appellees today as 
the prevailing party.  Fees must be sought, however, in a 
separate motion, detailing the amount requested.   
